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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (21 Aug 69) FOR OT UT, 692307

15 September 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:


ROBERT E. LYNCH

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Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS
APO San Francisco 96308

AVII-GCT

4 June 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

The inclosed Operational Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 525-15 and AR 525-15.

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H. R. TAYLOR
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AVII-GCT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

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SECTION I. OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION

1. (U) On 23 April 1969 a provisional command was formed under HQ, XXIV Corps. This command, XXIV Corps Special Troops, has administrative command of two companies and three detachments assigned to HQ, XXIV Corps.

2. (U) Three units assigned or under the operational control of HQ, XXIV Corps, and formerly in a provisional status, became numbered units during the report period. This resulted from modified tables of organization and equipment being approved by Department of the Army. These units are:

- a. 108th Transportation Company (Car)
- b. 24th Public Information Detachment
- c. 62d Aviation Company

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Intelligence Planning: During the report period, XXIV Corps OFORD 11-69, "Spring Offensive", was published with emphasis on locating and destroying enemy forces, installations, and storage areas in the highlands of the Corps AO, while continuing the accelerated attack against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The "Rice Denial" operations order was also published during the quarter. Aggressive, combined US/GVN operations are being conducted in accordance with that order to deny the enemy access to the spring rice harvest, and to secure the maximum amount of rice for the civilian populace. Both operations orders are currently being implemented.

2. (C) B-52 Bombing Program: There were thirty-five B-52 strikes in the Corps TAOR during the quarter; fourteen in February, fourteen in March, and seven in April. Subdivided into geographic areas, twenty-four strikes were employed in the vicinity of Base Area (BA) 611, six in the vicinity of the A Shau Valley, two in the western DMZ area, and three in areas adjacent to the Corps AO. Of the thirty-five B-52 strikes, twenty-one were flown in support of Operation Dewey Canyon, five for Massachusetts Striker, three for Maine Crag, two for Purple Martin, and four were in support of unnamed operations. Ground follow-up in strike areas indicates the use of well planned B-52 strikes contributes to overall operational success and continues to prevent the enemy from massing personnel, supplies, and equipment, thus considerably reducing his threat to Free World Forces in the Corps AO.

3. (C) Intelligence Collection:

a. Prisoners of War (PW) Interrogation. During the report period, there was an increase in the number of PW reports. The intelligence provided by NVA PW's aided significantly in Operations Purple Martin, Maine Crag, and Massachusetts Striker, by identifying enemy units, their disposition, capabilities, and intentions.

b. Ground Reconnaissance. Aggressive ground reconnaissance patrols in the XXIV Corps AO produced good results. These patrols had in excess of one hundred contacts resulting in over one hundred enemy KIA. There were ~~over~~ one hundred

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sightings without contact that provided intelligence data resulting in the location of numerous enemy bunker complexes and base camps. Intelligence data furnished by ground patrols also resulted in the discovery of some of the largest rice caches of the war.

c. Technical Intelligence. During the report period, XXIV Corps continued monitoring items of technical intelligence interest. This was accomplished through effective liaison between the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center Team, the 3d Marine Division, and 101st Airborne Division (AM). At the request of field units, a "go team" is dispatched to cache sites to provide expertise in the analysis and evaluation of captured enemy equipment. Additionally, 78 war trophy pistols and rifles were registered by the Technical Intelligence Section: 29 pistols and 49 rifles.

4. (C-NOFORN) Ground Surveillance:

a. During December 1968, personnel of the 3d Marine Division and 101st Airborne Division (AM) were trained on the use of Duffel Bag sensors by technical liaison teams. On 14 December 1968, the 3d Marine Division began emplacing Duffel Bag sensors, while the 101st Airborne Division (AM) began sensor emplacement on 28 December 1968.

b. On 3 February 1969, Special Projects previously assigned to the G2 Section, was transferred to the G2 Section and renamed Ground Surveillance. Because sensor operations acquire both target information and intelligence, sensor operations were integrated into the intelligence gathering functions of G2, XXIV Corps.

5. (C) General Enemy Situation:

a. During the report period, the Winter-Spring Offensive dominated enemy activity in Quang Tri Province. This offensive can be subdivided into three phases, (1) Pre-Tet General Offensive Period; (2) Tet General Offensive Period; and (3) Post-Tet General Offensive Period. Two very significant events occurred during the report period: Allied Forces extended ground operations to all borders of Quang Tri Province, and the NVA/VC Tet General Offensive failed to produce a single major victory for the enemy, although a few minor tactical successes were achieved, primarily through sapper attacks. The center of activity in Quang Tri Province during the Pre-Tet period (1 Feb 69 - 22 Feb 69) was Operation Dewey Canyon in the Da Krong Valley - BA 611 Area. On 2 Feb 69, FSB Cunningham received the first incoming artillery rounds in the Province since 10 Nov 68. During Operation Dewey Canyon, which terminated on 11 Mar 69, the enemy suffered 1617 casualties, lost several hundred tons of ammunition, 1406 weapons and 15 artillery pieces. This operation cut the enemy's supply lines, prevented reinforcements from reaching the coastal areas, and inflicted serious losses on the enemy in terms of both men and material. The enemy's Tet General Offensive plans in both the Quang Tri Province and Thua Thien Province lowlands were seriously disrupted. Despite the large number of casualties inflicted on the enemy, only the 675th NVA Artillery Regiment and 4th Engineer Regiment/559th Transportation Group were identified in Operation Dewey Canyon, indicating the enemy took extreme caution in removing identifying documents from personnel before committing them to combat. During the first two weeks of the Pre-Tet period, enemy initiated activity increased in the area immediately south of the DMZ and consisted primarily of attacks by fire, small ground attacks, and the employment of mines on land LOC's and the Cuu Viet River. During the third

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week of the Pre-Tet period, enemy activity decreased sharply as the enemy declared a one week cease fire in commemoration of Tet. The Tet General Offensive period occurred from 22 Feb 69 to 31 Mar 69. Coordinated attacks by fire and sappers on 24-25 Feb 69 directed against FSB's Russell and Neville, probably by elements of the 246th NVA Regiment, were the first major events of the Tet General Offensive in Quang Tri Province. The reappearance of the 246th NVA Regiment in an infantry role marked a significant change from that unit's previous logistical activities. Throughout the Tet General Offensive, enemy activity was concentrated in the area between the DMZ and the Cua Viet River/Route 9 area, with a conspicuous lack of activity in the Trieu Phong lowlands. Enemy activity consisted primarily of attacks by fire, convoy ambushes, mining of land LOC's and the Cua Viet River, and ground attacks usually by company size or smaller units. Operation Montana Mauler (23 Mar 69 to 3 Apr 69) resulted in two battalion sized contacts in the area north of Route 9 between Cam Lo and Elliott Combat Base. Nearly 300 enemy from the 1st and 2nd Battalions/27th NVA Regiment were killed, rendering those units combat ineffective. It appears the 27th NVA Regiment was massing northwest of Cam Lo for an attack on that city or possibly to interdict Route 9 when contact initiated by Allied Forces preempted the Regiment's attack plans. Elements of the 34th Rocket Artillery Regiment were also active northwest of Cam Lo in conducting attacks by fire primarily against C2 Base. A PW captured on 22 Feb 69, reported the 31st Group had been upgraded in January 1969 to the 31st Regiment, which added an additional battalion, the 15th Battalion. The new battalion has yet to be identified in contact. The enemy sharply increased his activity within the DMZ during the Tet General Offensive and conducted 28 attacks by fire from within the DMZ during that period. Enemy activity in the eastern DMZ increased sharply with elements of the 31st Regiment, 138th NVA Regiment, and 126th Naval Sapper Regiment probably responsible for most of the activity. On 1 Mar 69, Operation Purple Martin in northwest Quang Tri Province was initiated. The enemy was either not capable or unwilling to commit a significant counterattacking force in this area, and preferred to limit activity to attacks by fire against FSB's and LZ's, ambushing, sniping, and employing mines and booby traps against ground troops. During the last week of February 1969, it became apparent that the enemy was extensively using Route 926/616 for wheeled and tracked vehicle traffic. On 15 March 1969, Operation Maine Crag commenced in the Khe Sanh/Vietnamese Salient Area to interdict enemy logistic activities. Again, the enemy was unwilling to commit a sizeable force against the Allied operation even to defend large rice caches which were discovered in the eastern Vietnamese Salient. Elements of the 75th Engineer Battalion/559 Transportation Group appeared in the Vietnamese Salient. During the Post-Tet General Offensive period (1 Apr 69 - 30 Apr 69), enemy initiated activity decreased to a low level, but enemy forces still maintained some presence through minor attacks by fire, snipings, and employment of mines and booby traps primarily in attempts at LOC interdiction. Most significant was the movement of an unidentified multi-regimental size force to an area in Laos west of the Vietnamese Salient. Thus far, that force has given no indication of its intentions, although it is capable of attacking into Maine Crag AO or thrusting even deeper into Quang Tri Province. Of significance was contact with 7th Front elements in the Vietnamese Salient. PW's were captured from the K-8 Battalion, K-14 Battalion, and following a sapper attack on FSB Torch, the 10th Sapper Battalion. Their statements indicate the 7th Front started withdrawing from BA 101 as early as December 1968 as Allied operations had apparently decimated their ranks, denied them access to the lowlands and the safety of BA 101. The enemy currently continues to pose a significant threat in the central DMZ area as elements of the 27th NVA Regiment, 31st Regiment, 246th NVA Regiment, 270th Regiment and 34th Rocket Artillery Regiment operate in the area. In addition the enemy has three tube

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artillery regiments and a division equivalent of infantry that could be committed to support units in the central and eastern DMZ. It is believed the enemy will not attempt to cross the DMZ in force but will continue to infiltrate troops and supplies into SVN.

b. Thua Thien Province. Enemy activity in Thua Thien Province has been moderate throughout the report period as the enemy waged the Winter-Spring Offensive. The Winter-Spring Offensive has taken the form of attacks by fire, primarily with 122mm rockets, on major Allied installations and Hue. Heaviest enemy activity occurred in early February 1969, continuing through March 1969. In April 1969 enemy activity subsided to a light level, possibly ending the Winter-Spring Offensive. The 4th NVA Regiment remained in Phu Loc District throughout the report period and avoided Allied contact. Activity by the 4th NVA Regiment consisted of attempts to interdict Highway 1 and the Hue - Da Nang Railroad. Several assassinations in Phu Loc District were possibly the work of the 4th NVA Regiment attempting to maintain some influence over the populace. The 5th NVA Regiment has been limited almost solely to attacks by fire and small sapper attacks. Since 1 February 1969, the K-32 Rocket Artillery Battalion has attacked with 122mm rockets on 12 occasions, striking Camp Eagle four times, Hue once, Phu Bai Combat Base three times, FSB Boyd and FSB Birmingham twice each. Elements of the Chi Thua I or II Sapper Battalions/5th NVA Regiment attacked FSB Spear on 3 Mar 69 resulting in 11 US KIA and 3 US WIA.

c. In mid-March 1969 Operation Massachusetts Striker began. Opposing forces were transportation and engineering elements of Binh Tam 42 in the southern A Shau Valley and the three battalions of the 9th NVA Regiment in the area southwest of Delta Junction (intersection of Rt 547 and Rt 547A). Throughout the operation only small sporadic contact has been made, however, several large caches have been found. The 9th NVA Regiment, by sniping and ambushing Allied patrols, has successfully minimized losses while inflicting light casualties on Allied forces. In mid-April 1969 the 5th NVA Regiment began to show more interest in Operation Massachusetts Striker. Recently captured documents indicated that in February 1969, the 5th NVA Regt was well supplied with food and munitions. Currently, with lines of supply interdicted between the A Shau Valley and southern Thua Thien Province, the stores of the 5th NVA may be dwindling. If supply levels diminish sufficiently, the 5th NVA Regiment could attempt to establish an alternate LOC to the upper A Shau Valley - RA 611 region, or may commit troops to Operation Massachusetts Striker in an effort to reopen supply lines. Northwest of Hue the 6th NVA Regiment's attempt at an offensive consisted primarily of attacks by fire. Between 1 Feb 69 and 15 Mar 69 the K35 Rocket Artillery Battalion struck Camp Evans three times and Hue, the An Lo Bridge and LZ Sally once each with 122mm rockets. Since 15 Mar 69 activity in the area north of Hue and contact with the 6th NVA Regiment has been light to non-existent. In mid-February 1969 the 6th NVA Regiment turned away from the coastal lowlands and focused on Operation Dewey Canyon. Possibly two battalions of the 6th NVA Regiment were committed against the Marines as elements of the K35 Rocket Artillery Battalion supported with rocket fire from the northern A Shau Valley. When Operation Dewey Canyon terminated, the 6th NVA Regiment returned to the area northwest of Hue and has remained relatively inactive. This inactivity could be due to losses suffered in Operation Dewey Canyon, although no evidence exists to confirm any losses by the 6th NVA Regiment. Lack of offensive activity by the Regiment since 15 Mar 69 may also be an indication that the Regiment has again diverted its attention from the lowlands, this time focusing on Operation Massachusetts Striker. Throughout the lowlands during the reporting period enemy activity has been light, consisting primarily of proselyting, reconnaissance, taxation and rice gathering. Most local units remain ineffective as Allied ambushes and cordons continue to erode their

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strength. A very successful ambush conducted east of Hue on 6 Apr 69 by the 227th RF Company resulted in 27 members of the C116 Local Force Company or local VCI either killed or captured.

d. **Enemy Capabilities.** The enemy retains the capability to attack by fire, interdict LOC's, terrorize the populace, and conduct limited ground attacks against specific objectives. Enemy forces will probably continue to avoid contact, rest and resupply, while awaiting a decision on when or whether to begin another phase of the Winter-Spring Offensive.

C. OPERATIONS

1. (U) The XXIV Corps Area of Operations remained generally the same during this report period, however, the AO was enlarged slightly to the south to allow the 101st Airborne Division (AM) to conduct Operation Massachusetts Striker.

2. (C) The following operations terminated during the report period:

a. **Operation Kentucky:** Elements of the 3d Marine Regiment conducted detailed clear and search/RIE/cordon operations in the area surrounding Cam Lo, C-2, and Con Thien, north to the DMZ. Extensive pacification efforts by GVN/US Forces were concentrated in the Cam Lo and Con Thien areas. Operation Kentucky, which commenced on 1 Nov 67, terminated on 28 Feb 69. Cumulative totals are shown below:

<u>Friendly</u>				<u>Enemy</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>FW</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>Det</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
520	3078	2399	1	3986	117	8	565	922	211

b. **Operation Nevada Eagle:** The 101st Airborne Division (AM) continued to clear and search the southern and western portions of their area of operations to eliminate elements of the 4th, 5th and 6th NVA Regiments. Effective employment of airmobile US forces in coordination with GVN Forces enabled the 101st Airborne Division (AM) to achieve excellent results in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign in the coastal area of their AO. Operation Nevada Eagle commenced on 17 Mar 68 and terminated on 28 Feb 69 with the following results:

<u>Friendly</u>			<u>Enemy</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>FW</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>Det</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
205	1322	1357	3299	353	714	4469	3379	323

c. **Operation Scotland II:** The 3d Marine Division employed Task Force Hotel in the northwestern portion of their AO. Task Force Hotel units concentrated on clear and search operations in the central area west of the Rock Pile and in the vicinity of Nutters Ridge. Ground contacts and attacks by fire increased slightly from the previous report period. Operation Scotland II commenced on 15 Apr 68 and terminated on 28 Feb 69 with the following results:

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Friendly

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>
500	2859	2179

Enemy

<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>Det</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
3309	64	0	283	971	242

d. Operation Marshall Mountain: The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) conducted extensive clear and search/cordon operations in coordination with GVN Forces in the eastern portion of Quang Tri Province from the DMZ south to the Quang Tri/Thua Thien Province boundary, and west into BA 101. Pacification efforts were directed toward the fishing villages east of Quang Tri City where excellent results were obtained during the previous report period. Operation Marshall Mountain commenced on 10 Dec 68 and terminated on 23 Feb 69 with the following results:

Friendly

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>
7	126	96

Enemy

<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>Det</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
78	31	0	143	71	0

e. Operation Platte Canyon: Elements of 101st Airborne Division (AB) combat assaulted into the Ruong Ruong Valley area to clear and search the suspect location of the 4th NVA Regiment. Inclement weather hampered the operation initially; however, ground contacts increased near the end of the operation. Operation Platte Canyon commenced on 8 Jan 69 and terminated on 5 Feb 69. Results are shown below:

Friendly

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>
10	21	3

Enemy

<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>Det</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
87	10	0	0	81	1

f. Operation Dewey Canyon: The 9th Marine Regiment with two battalions of the 1st ARVN Div conducted a clear and search operation deep into the Da Krong Valley area adjacent to the Laotian border. In spite of inclement weather, that severely hampered tactical operations and logistical support throughout the seven week operation, Dewey Canyon is recognized as one of the most significant operations of the Vietnam Conflict, both in concept and results. It struck the enemy unexpectedly in time and place; destroyed an NVA base area; an LOC control center; and pre-empted a planned NVA spring offensive in the ICTZ. Operation Dewey Canyon achieved the following results during the period 24 Jan 69 - 13 Mar 69:

Friendly

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA*</u>	<u>MIA</u>
130	920	1

Enemy

<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>Det</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
1617	5	2	8	1223	243

*Evac and non evac

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(1) Ordinance Captured:

7,287 rounds 122mm Arty	23,281 rounds 82mm Mort
770 rounds 122m Rkts	994 rounds 75mm RR
257 rounds 140mm Rkts	34,683 rounds 60mm Mort
4,983 rounds 120mm Mort	2,004 rounds 57mm RR
556 rounds 85mm Arty	23,730 rounds 37mm AA Ammo
14,808 rounds B40/B41 Rkts	65,126 rounds 12.7mm AA Ammo
3,636 rounds 23mm AA Ammo	10,226 rifle grenades
50,203 hand grenades	855 AP Mines
1,621 AT Mines	607,874 rounds small arms ammo
444 Claymore Mines	920 rounds 20mm AA
17,598 rounds 50 Cal	10 rounds 75mm Arty

(2) Vehicles Captured:

66 trucks (31 intact)	15 bulldozers
6 Arty prime movers, (Tracked)	3 APC's
1 jeep	3 generators
3 engines	1 air compressor
1 front loader	
108 bicycles plus 2,716 tires (assembly plant)	

(3) Class I Supplies Captured:

110 tons of rice
2 tons of salt
Small quantities of other grains, vegetables and oils

(4) Installations Destroyed or Neutralized:

Two major headquarters at Tam Boi.
Two major vehicle maintenance/repair facilities.
One major commo center, plus several kilometers of trunk lines destroyed.
Several battalion rear service camps.
An unspecified installation housed in ten large, impregnable tunnels in the vicinity of Tam Boi.

g. Operation Ohio Rapids: The 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AM) and two ARVN battalions conducted this clear and search operation in BA 101 and areas to the south and east of BA 101. Ground contacts were limited to sound size or smaller. Operation Ohio Rapids commenced on 24 Jan 69 and terminated on 23 Feb 69 with the following combined results for ARVN and US Forces:

Friendly

KIA	MIA	EVAC
12	75	67

Enemy

KIA	FW	Ret	Det	IR	C/SW
116	5	1	0	73	15

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h. Operation Sherman Park: A battalion from the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AM) plus one ARVN battalion from the 3d Regiment, 1st ARVN Division conducted this clear and search operation south of EA 114 along Route 547 to verify intelligence reports of suspected enemy locations within the AO. The operation commenced on 25 Jan 69 and was terminated on 2 Feb 69 without significant results.

i. Operation Spokane Rapids: Operation Spokane Rapids was conducted in the area southwest of EA 114. The two-week operation attempted to locate enemy units operating in an area along Route 547 and south of previously occupied TSB's. Operation Spokane Rapids commenced on 20 Feb 69 and terminated on 3 Mar 69 with the following results:

<u>Friendly</u>			<u>Enemy</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>Det</u>	<u>IM</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
3	15	9	11	0	0	0	9	1

j. Operation Montana Mauler: Operation Montana Mauler commenced on 23 Mar 69 as elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), 3d Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry and 1st Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment along with elements of the 3d Marine Regiment conducted clear and search operations between US gridlines XD99 and YD05 from Route 9 north to the DMZ. The operation terminated on 3 Apr 69 with the following results:

<u>Friendly</u>			<u>Enemy</u>					
<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>IM</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>Det</u>	<u>IM</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
25	227	128	295	0	0	0	38	12

k. Operation Willis Ravine: The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) conducted this clear and search operation in the Ba Long Valley east of Vandegrift Combat Base to intercept enemy movement along the major avenue of approach to Quang Tri City. The operation commenced on 3 Apr 69 and terminated on 15 Apr 69 without significant results.

3. (C) The following operations are still in progress. Results to date are shown in paragraph 3g below.

a. Purple Martin: Task Force 101 deployed the 4th Marine Regiment in the northwest portion of the 3d Marine Division AO in the area previously occupied by the Scotland II AO. This clear and search operation extends to the Laotian border on the west and the DMZ on the north. Ground contacts and attacks by fire have occurred frequently.

b. Kentucky Jumper: In this operation the 101st Airborne Division (AM) embarked on a new spring offensive designed to amplify the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, and to deny the enemy freedom of movement in the southern and western portion of Thien Province. Kentucky Jumper commenced on 1 Mar 69.

c. Massachusetts Striker: This operation spearheaded the spring offensive into the southern portion of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) AO and was designed to open Route 547 into the A Shau Valley; interdict Highway 548 running north and south through the A Shau, and to regain control of terrain previously controlled by the NVA. Significant contacts and caches have highlighted the operation.

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d. **Maine Crag:** This operation exploited intelligence information concerning the Khe Sanh area and the area south and east of Khe Sanh. Several large **caches**, including 356 tons of rice, have been captured. TF Remagen, organized with a mechanized infantry company, a tank company and a self-propelled artillery battery was later reinforced with the 2d Squadron, 7th ARVN Cavalry and conducted RIF operations along Route 616 and then reverted to clear and search operations in the vicinity of Lang Vei and Khe Sanh. TF Remagen terminated on 28 Apr 69.

e. **Bristol Boots:** Operation Bristol Boots commenced on 25 Apr 69 as elements of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AM) reinforced with the 3d Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry initiated operations into Ruong Ruong Valley to exploit intelligence reports of enemy activity within the AO.

f. **3d Marine Division AO:** The 3d Marine Division, commencing on 1 Mar 69, conducted unnamed clear and search operations/RIF/cordon operations in the vicinity of Vandegrift Combat Base and in the area south and west to Hill 950 and FSB Cates, also in the vicinity of the Rockpile, Cam Lo, C-2, and A-4 to the DMZ. Other unnamed operations have been conducted in the eastern and southern portion of Quang Tri Province. The operations in the Cam Lo/C-2 area were characterized by area pacification efforts in conjunction with GVN Forces.

g. Statistical Data of Current Operations:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Starting Date</u>	<u>Friendly</u>			<u>Enemy</u>					
		<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>EVAC</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>Det</u>	<u>Iw</u>	<u>C/SW</u>
Purple Martin	23 Feb 69	74	251	228	239	4	0	6	192	10
Kentucky Jumper	1 Mar 69	99	402	351	405	21	4	367	1010	45
Massachusetts Striker	1 Mar 69	69	243	227	170	2	1	0	839	33
Maine Crag	15 Mar 69	21	134	125	157	3	0	54	414	21
Bristol Boots	25 Apr 69	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
3d Mar Div AO	<u>1 Mar 69</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>374</u>	<u>287</u>	<u>721</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>168</u>	<u>34</u>
Totals		328	1404	1218	1692	61	7	585	2624	143

h. Rice Captured:

1 Thua Thien Province 18 tons

2 Quang Tri Province 476 tons

TOTALS 494 tons

4. (C) Task Force Clearwater.

a. During the report period Task Force Clearwater detected 60,292 vessels on the inland waterways within the XXIV Corps AO. Sailors boarded and searched 34,247

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vessels or approximately 57% of all vessels detected, and inspected 16,426 vessels without boarding or approximately 27%. Vessels were searched for weapons, unmanifested cargo, improper ID cards and draft dodgers. There were 525 individuals detained for the following violations: 2 suspected VC, 135 curfew violators, 179 improper ID cards, 59 restricted area violators, 21 on Black List, 6 draft dodgers, 34 evading patrol, and 89 others for suspicious actions. There were 14 NVA/VC killed in action. The patrol craft of the River Security Groups also conducted an active PSYOP program. The results of the Voluntary Informant Program (VIP), since 22 Jan 69 have been 199,700 \$VN paid to the children along the Cua Viet River for munitions turned in.

b. The enemy has increased his efforts to close the Cua Viet LOC during the period by a combination of mining and swimmer/sapper attacks on Naval Support Activity Da Nang (NASD), Cua Viet. Losses have been two PBR's (patrol boat, river) damaged by a mine explosion, and five logistics craft; four LCM-3's and one LCM-6 were damaged by the swimmer/sapper attacks. One man was killed in action during the swimmer/sapper attack 21 Feb 69; no cargo was lost. The mining threat has been countered to date, by use of the improved bottom catenary and surface sweeps in combination with the MK-3A2 concussion grenade. A total of eleven mining incidents were initiated by the enemy. Swimmer/sapper attacks were experienced on 21 Feb 69 and 14 Apr 69 and were responsible for the logistic craft losses of NASD, Cua Viet.

c. The PBR's of the Hue River Security Group have had to resume continuous patrols on the Perfume River with the expected movement of River Assault Group 32 from the AO. Patrol air cushion vehicles (RACV's) have again become operational and are in control of Cau Hai Bay.

D. LOGISTICS

1. (U) General. During the period covered by this report, the logistics posture in the XXIV Corps AO continued to improve. The most notable improvement was in the area of maintenance and the resultant decrease in deadline rates for Corps units. The decrease in deadline rates is attributed to the following:

a. Conversion from M48A2 to M48A3 tanks in the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

b. Increased stockage levels of repair parts for combat vehicles in NICTZ.

c. Programmed quarterly maintenance (Repair and Return) and improved ASL's and PLL's for M109 and M110 artillery weapons.

2. (C) Significant Activities.

a. Operation Dewey Canyon.

(1) During the period 22 Jan 69 to 18 Mar 69, the 3d Marine Division, in conjunction with the 1st ARVN Division conducted Operation Dewey Canyon. Resupply, which averaged over 140 short tons per day, was accomplished entirely by airlift. This resupply was hampered by adverse weather conditions over extended periods. When weather prohibited normal helicopter resupply, fixed wing transport aircraft and helicopters paraded emergency rations and ammunition to units. Operating above the cloud cover with releases controlled by radar, 50 percent of the parades were recovered.

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(2) Interservice logistical support was a significant factor in the success of Operation Dewey Canyon. Due to the limited number of heavy-lift helicopters available to the 3d Marine Division, XXIV Corps Headquarters in conjunction with the 101st Airborne Division (AM) provided a substantial number of Army CH-47 helicopters. These additional helicopters gave the 3d Marine Division a greater lift capability and permitted surging of supplies during favorable weather.

b. During the period 20-21 Feb 69, a 3d Marine Regimental Task Force returned to Dong Ha from An Hoa after participating in Operation Taylor Common under the OPCON of the 1st Marine Division. The air movement consisted of 17 C-130 sorties; moving 950 passengers, 8 short tons of cargo, 6-105mm howitzers and 39 vehicles. Additionally, 3 LCU's were employed to provide surface transport for over 200 short tons of cargo and 18 vehicles. No significant problems were encountered.

c. On 2 Mar 69, XXIV Corps Administrative Order No. 1 was published. This order allows the publication of XXIV Corps operation plans and orders with logistics annexes containing only changes to standard procedures.

d. On 16 Mar 69, Task Force Remagen was organized and commenced operations which continued until 28 Apr 69. The task force operated in the vicinity of Lang Vei and Khe Sanh. The task organization was as follows:

- 1 - Battalion headquarters.
- 1 - Scout platoon.
- 1 - 4.2 inch mortar platoon
- 1 - Mechanized infantry company
- 1 - Tank company.
- 1 - Cavalry troop (ARVN).
- 1 - Artillery battery (105mm) (SP).
- 1 - Provisional artillery battery (3 tubes) 155mm).

Resupply was almost entirely by air, with an average of over 36 short tons per day lifted by helicopters. No major logistics problems were encountered.

e. On 1 Apr 69, the hold baggage processing facility at Phu Bai Combat Base was moved to Tan My. The remote location of the facility causes difficulties in transporting baggage to Tan My for out-processing. Incoming hold baggage still arrives at the Hue/Phu Bai Air Terminal, and is transported from Phu Bai to Tan My, then transported by the individual's unit back to the Phu Bai area. Relocation of the facility to Phu Bai Combat Base is under consideration by III Marine Amphibious Force.

E. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND MEDICAL

1. (U) Civilian Personnel Management. The authorization for direct hire of Vietnamese Nationals in the command increased from 52 to 59. The number of daily hire Vietnamese Nationals remained constant commensurate with construction requirements.

2. (U) Special Services. During the report period considerable progress was made in the construction program for recreational facilities. A 40' by 60' swimming pool was completed and is in use. Tennis courts and concrete foundations for a mobile library and photo lab are in the final stages of construction. Baseball and

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softball leagues are being planned to provide a variety of activities for personnel assigned to the area.

3. (U) Religious Activities.

a. The comparative stability of units in the XXIV Corps AO assisted in providing adequate religious coverage. Cross-service support between Army, Navy and Marine Chaplains was effective in providing coverage for all units. The Easter Season for Protestant and Catholic personnel and the Passover Observance for Jewish personnel were well observed throughout the Corps AO. Throughout these religious seasons appropriate religious services for all faiths were conducted in addition to regularly scheduled services.

b. Three monthly training conferences were conducted for XXIV Corps Chaplains. Various subjects of interest to chaplains were presented which included a conference led by the Chief of Chaplains, CH (MG) Francis L. Sampson and a program by the 29th Civil Affairs Company concerning the missions and functions of the Company and the chaplains' relationship to civil affairs.

c. During the report period the 31st Chaplains Detachment was assigned to the XXIV Corps. It has an authorized strength of four officers and four EM and provides religious coverage for advisory groups located in ICTZ.

4. (C) Medical

a. During the report period the three hospitals located in the Corps AO continued to improve their facilities. A 250-man messhall is nearing completion at the 22d Surgical Hospital; the 85th Evacuation Hospital has expanded the capacity of its present facility to 133 beds by the addition of a new ward; and the 18th Surgical Hospital has under construction modern latrine and shower facilities. The site for the relocation of the 85th Evacuation Hospital has been prepared; however, vertical construction has been delayed due to lack of blueprints at Mobile Construction Battalion 40. This new facility is urgently needed to increase the capability of retaining more patients in the area. Currently, approximately 1000 patients a month are evacuated out of the Corps area.

b. A coordinated effort was initiated to combat the outbreak of plague in the civilian populace in Thua Thien Province. Medical personnel from XXIV Corps, 172d Preventive Medicine Unit, Combined Action Group #3, Mobile Construction Battalion 40, MACV Advisory Teams and the 101st Airborne Division (AM), in association with RVN medical personnel are participating. Primary anti-plague measures include inoculation of personnel and dissemination of insecticide to eliminate the flea vector. Coordination of inoculation efforts is being made to prevent a similar outbreak of cholera.

F. INSPECTOR GENERAL

None.

G. INFORMATION

1. (U) General. Effective 30 Apr 69, the Stars and Stripes Bookstore assumed

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responsibility for distributing free copies of the Stars and Stripes. This results in a workload reduction for the AG and IO, who formerly shared in the pick-up and distribution of the newspapers.

2. (U) Public Information.

a. Coverage was furnished Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's visit to XXIV Corps and the 1st ARVN Division.

b. Five interviews were coordinated with the Commanding General, Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff for members of the press.

c. One briefing was coordinated with the G2 for members of the press.

d. Eight features on Corps activities were prepared and released.

e. There were 250 press representative visitors to the Press Camp - 128 were billeted.

H. COMMAND HISTORIAN

None.

I. ARMY AVIATION

1. (U) The Corps Aviation Company (Prov) was redesignated the 62d Aviation Company (Corps) on 4 Mar 69. Aircraft assets of the company were increased by two UH-1H's and one OH-6A during the month of April 1969, giving the company a total of ten UH-1's, three OH-6's, and two U-21's.

2. (U) During the period 20 Mar 69 to 12 Apr 69, a low level navigation test, utilizing nondirectional beacons, was conducted in the Northern I Corps Tactical Zone. Equipment and operator personnel were supplied by 1st Mobile Communications Group, Clark AFB, Phillipines, and the test was conducted by the XXIV Corps Aviation Section. Equipment consisted of two MRN-13 beacons and four 10 KW generators. The test was conducted by placing the two beacons at various locations in the XXIV Corps AO and flying triangular patterns from these beacons to existing beacons. Test flights were conducted with Corps aviation assets and were flown at an altitude of ten feet above the highest obstacle along the flight route. This system of navigational aids is adaptable for use during periods of low ceiling and visibility. Results of the test are being analyzed at this time for possible future use.

J. SIGNAL

1. (U) Discontinuance of Hill 180 as a Signal Relay Activity. During the first month of this report period, plans were implemented to discontinue the use of Hill 180 (YD 855133) as a radio relay site. This hill was essential to signal communications between Phu Bai Combat Base and locations north of Dong Ha when the Corps Area Communications System consisted almost entirely of 12-channel VHF equipment, however the introduction of 24-channel tropospheric-scatter equipment lessened the need for the relay site. The activation of two tropospheric-scatter systems between Phu Bai Combat Base and Quang Tri and the installation of a relay facility at Tan My (YD 818323) allowed the deactivation of those 12-channel systems that were relayed via Hill 180. On 28 Feb 69, signal equipment and personnel were removed from this signal site.

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2. (U) Activation of 50-Pair Tie Cable, Hue MACV Compound - Hue Citadel. On 3 Mar 69, acceptance tests were conducted and a 50-pair tie cable was activated between Hue MACV Compound and Hue Citadel (HQ 1st ARVN Division). This cable offers more reliable communications between these two military compounds and allows the US advisory element at Hue Citadel to receive telephone service directly from the Hue MACV AN/MTC-1 switchboard.

3. (U) Replacement of AN/MTC-1 Switchboard in XXIV Corps TOC. The cutover to a new AN/MTC-1 Switchboard for the XXIV Corps Tactical Operations Center was completed on 18 Mar 69. The switchboard, from ICTZ Signal Group assets, replaced the AN/MTC-1 that was previously installed by the 1st Marine Division and later hand-receipted to the 63d Signal Battalion.

4. (U) Activation of the Da Nang Tandem Switch. Upon the activation of the Da Nang Tandem Switch on 13 Apr 69, Class "A" subscribers of the Phu Bai Dial Telephone Exchange (DTE) and other DTE's in I Corps Tactical Zone were afforded the capability of dialing direct to any other dial instrument in the Southeast Asia-Automatic Telephone System (SEA-ATS). The Da Nang Tandem Switch is operated by the 1972d Communications Squadron, USAF, and at the close of this report period, has 21 primary direct dial trunks connected to the Phu Bai DTE.

5. (U) AUTOSEVOCOM Terminal for XXIV Corps G2. A wideband AUTOSEVOCOM terminal was activated on 20 Apr 69 for the XXIV Corps G2. This Phase II installation is a subscriber station of Secure Cord Board 35 in Phu Bai.

6. (C) VHF Support for Operation Massachusetts Striker. Contingency equipment of the 63d Signal Battalion, ICTZ Signal Group, was committed on 23 Apr 69 in support of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) Operation Massachusetts Striker. XXIV Corps OPLAN 10-69, (Division Support Communications Contingency Plan), dated 19 Feb 69 provides supplemental 12-channel systems to divisions when tactical operations require such support. The OPLAN was implemented on 22 Apr 69 and, with 24 hours notice, a 12-channel system was installed between FSB Whip (YC 535847) 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AM) (Fwd), and LZ Sally (YC 638274) 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AM) (Main).

7. (U) SEAWBS-ICS Reconfiguration in NICTZ. During this report period, work was completed on the final leg of the Phase II Southeast Asia Wideband System - Integrated Communication System (SEAWBS-ICS) overbuild program. The final installation, accepted on 20 Apr 69, was a 120-channel TRC-109 microwave system, 77UM6R, from Dong Ha to Quang Tri City. This system replaces the TRC-139 microwave system, 77UM6L, from Dong Ha Combat Base to Quang Tri City and provides for the imminent deactivation of two Defense Communication Agency managed 12-channel TRC-24 systems that serve as overflow systems for the expanded communications requirement in NICTZ.

K. ENGINEER

1. (U) During the report period the following construction projects were completed:

a. Redecking and placement of a pedestrian catwalk on the Hue Railroad/Highway Bridge.

b. Billeting, maintenance and storage facilities for B Company, 5th Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Service at Phu Bai Combat Base.

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- c. Construction of the initial build of SEA huts and mess halls at LZ Sally and LZ Nancy.
- d. Billeting, maintenance, parking and take off facilities for C Company, 101st Assault Support Helicopter Battalion at Phu Bai Combat Base.
- e. Extension and matting of the Vandegrift Combat Base airstrip.
- f. 5 UH-1 hangars in the XXIV Corps AO.
- g. Sand stabilization of the Quang Tri Airfield.
- 2. (U) Major construction projects started during period:
 - a. Pier protection for the Hue Highway/Railroad Bridge.
 - b. Construction of the Cam Lo Bridge (YD 149604).
 - c. Construction of a parallel taxiway - Hue/Phu Bai Airfield.
 - d. Realignment of QL-1 to parallel the railroad from the My Chanh Bridge (YD 460400) to the Quang Tri Bridge (YD 330519).
- 3. (C) Major bridge repair projects scheduled to begin during the next report period.
 - a. Song Bo Railroad Bridge (YD 614278)
 - b. Hien Si Bridge (YD 610278)
 - c. Bau Vit Bridge (YD 325520)
- 4. (U) Land Clearing: The 59th Land Clearing Company under the OPCON of the 45th Engineer Group (Const) accomplished the following during the report period:
 - a. Leatherneck Square (Dong Ha - Cam Lo - Con Thien - Gio Linh) cleared 10,000 acres - project completed.
 - b. Route 547/547A - cleared 2,000 of 4,500 acres.
- 5. (U) Primary lines of communication. There were 22.5 miles of paving (1st lift) accomplished during the period and 3.5 miles of second lift paving applied.
- 6. (U) Secondary lines of communication.
 - a. Work continued on the secondary LOC program. Effort was concentrated on Route 560 from Quang Tri to Cua Viet, and on Route 552 east of Hue from Huong Thuy to Phu Thu Bridge site. Work on Route 560 is being performed by the 101st ARVN Engineer Battalion with assistance from the 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat). The work on Route 552 is being accomplished by the 1st and 101st ARVN Engineer Battalions with assistance from 326th Engineer Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (AM) and the 27th Engineer Battalion. D Company, 87th Engineer Battalion has started construction on the Phu Thu Bridge. It is contemplated that one platoon of the 1st

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ARVN Engineer Battalion will be committed to assist in this project.

b. Culvert materials and a motor grader were airlifted to Vinh Loc Island to assist the District Advisor in his road construction program.

7. (C) Bridge Interdiction. Two major bridges were damaged by enemy interdiction during the period:

a. Nong Railroad Bridge (YD 9261041). 150 ft damaged to the extent that replacement was required. Task was completed by the Mobile Construction Battalion 121 in ten days.

b. Pohl Bridge (Nam Hoa YD 756138). One pile and 20 ft of stringers and decking were damaged on this Ammi Type Highway Bridge. The 3rd Bridge Company (FMF) bridged the gap with M-6 bridging. The Mobile Construction Battalion 121 completed permanent repairs in two days.

L. G-5 ACTIVITIES

1. (U) Civic Action Activities.

a. During this report period, continued progress in the pacification program can, in part, be attributed to the level of major combat activities and to an increased emphasis on military civic action. Self-help was again the keynote of civic action activities within XXIV Corps. Projects, whenever possible, were geared to meet the desires of the people. As a result, units consistently reported that more than 60% of the work on projects was accomplished by self-help labor. During the quarter, units under the OPCON of XXIV Corps spent over 5500 man days (10 hour work-day) in civic action projects. The two civic action coordinators, the 101st Airborne Division (AM) and 3d Marine Division reported over 1000 MEDCAPS and over 100,000 patients treated during the period. Corps units have made available to the people over thirty tons of commodities to include soap, food items, medical supplies, care kits and various construction materials such as sand, gravel, tile, bricks and both salvage and quality lumber. Added to this was the support of 420 projects (to include schools, orphanages, hospitals and dispensaries) by monies, technical advice and direct assistance.

b. The projects undertaken by the XXIV Corps cover a wide spectrum:

(1) 3d Marine Division

a. The Division has been active in numerous county fairs and cordon and search operations. Associated activities included transportation, food, MEDCAPS, DENTCAPS and band and other forms of entertainment.

b. Refugee resettlement activities are being coordinated by the G-5 and the Province Refugee Advisor. To date, over 1300 families have been resettled in the Cam Vu Resettlement Project. The details of this project will be covered in the next Operational Report - Lessons Learned.

c. Two school dedications took place during the report period. The Foremost - McPherson Dairy Company donated funds for a school to be constructed by the 3d Marine Division with the cooperation of the 32nd Naval Construction Regiment.

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d The Quang Tri Childrens' Hospital, being sponsored by the 3d Marine Division, held a corner-stone laying ceremony on 9 Apr 69.

e Commercial enterprise is being expanded through the opening of a Bru gift shop at Dong Ha. Plans are also being developed throughout the Corps AO for the establishment of Bru gift shops in US/FWMAF base camps. Another commercial enterprise being developed in Quang Tri is a general store where farmers will be able to purchase all types of farm equipment to include water pumps, seeds, fertilizer, etc.

(2) 101st Airborne Division (AM).

a Increased awareness by Vietnamese civilians of civic action programs was made through the combined efforts of civil affairs and psychological operations. Loud-speaker teams and leaflet drops informed the indigenous populace of the services available through civic action. Examples of the services are MEDCAPS, rodent controls, immunization, distribution of commodities and entertainment.

b Project "Screaming Eagles", in which members of the Division made voluntary monetary contributions to purchase baby chickens from Singapore, was a great success. 500 chickens were delivered during the first part of April 1969. Thua Thien Province personnel have made arrangements for the purchase of another 5000 at the end of April 1969. This is considered one of the better long range programs. The local people received instructions in chicken raising from a Vietnamese agricultural expert, and two months' supplies of food and medicine for the chickens have been distributed.

c The 101st Airborne Division (AM), G5 and Surgeon, are presently working with the Thua Thien Province Chief and his committee to further improve MEDCAP's. They have already accomplished regularly scheduled MEDCAP's and are now taking steps to increase coverage and expand their training programs. They are also establishing administrative procedures in each hamlet by which current medical records can be maintained on each person.

d Orphanage surveys are being conducted in Thu Thien Province to ensure equitable assistance. It has been noticed that some institutions are relatively well off, while others barely exist. No new orphanages are under construction, however, additions and improvements are being made to those already in existence.

e Resettlement of refugees in Thua Thien Province has increased. During the report period, over 35,000 refugees returned to their homes or resettled in non-permanent locations. If the project continues at the present rate, the 1969 goal of resettling 90,000 people will be achieved.

(3) Miscellaneous accomplishments:

a The fishing industry has expanded in both provinces (see Incl 3, Operation Fisher). This expansion, largely due to the relaxation of waterway restrictions and construction of roads between fishing villages and markets, has had immediate effects on the economic system. Larger quantities of fish are being sold in the markets, which has increased the fishermen's income and lowered the price to the consumer.

b The number of American personnel touring Hue City has increased. This project was initiated during the last report period. The fee is nominal and a large

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portion of the profits from the tour are applied to the renovation of destroyed cultural sites. Thus, a troop recreational activity serves to help rebuild Hue.

g. Individuals and units of Phu Bai Combat Base participating in Project Tractor, contributed \$4518.80. The money was used to purchase six Kubota power tillers, six sets of special steel paddy wheels, and other miscellaneous agricultural items. The implements were presented to the Vietnamese farmers through the Chiefs of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

d. The XXIV Corps Assistance in Kind Fund was established at \$100,000 \$VN for use in supporting civic action programs of non-divisional units.

g. The monthly G-5 conferences and periodic information bulletins were continued during the report period.

c. Civic Action Effectiveness.

(1) The following results are from successful civic action programs throughout XXIV Corps.

a. The local populace displays a more responsive attitude toward American soldiers and Vietnamese Government representatives. Their will to rebuild and the amount of work put into the construction of permanent type building indicates their faith in the ability of the government to protect and lead them.

b. The Quang Tri Province Chief has put high priorities on the reservoir and irrigation systems in Cam Lo and Cam Vu Districts. These projects are scheduled to operate with little or no American support.

c. MEDCAP's continue to be the most effective civic action projects, since they allow individuals to see immediate results in their state of health. MEDCAP's also bring Vietnamese and American medical personnel together and allow each to learn from the other.

(2) The effectiveness of the civic action program can only be achieved when the people have pride in rebuilding their nation, a sense of accomplishment and a feeling of identification with their government. This is occurring within NICTZ.

2. (U) Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

a. The XXIV Corps, G-5 PSYOP Division continues to monitor and supervise PSYOP programs/campaigns being conducted by units under COMUSMACV of XXIV Corps and to coordinate PSYOP activities with ARVN, Provincial and III Marine Amphibious Force agencies.

b. The PSYOP Division distributed sample copies of "Thong Cam" magazine, prepared by the 4th Psychological Operations Group, to local industrial relations offices as well as the CORDS PSYOP Advisors in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The magazine contains an explanation of labor directives, employee photographs, news pages, English lessons, featured employee of the month and other articles of general interest to Vietnamese agencies. It is believed by all that this magazine will do much to promote better understanding between US and Vietnamese personnel. Full scale distribution within NICTZ is scheduled to begin in July 1969.

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c. The number of Hoi Chanh rallying to the Allies continued to decrease from 221 last quarter to 199 during the current report period. This decline is a continuation of a downward trend which began in November 1968 and would have been even more severe had it not been for the success of the Quang Tri Chieu Hoi advisors and the 3d Marine Division's success in inducing Bru Montagnard tribesmen to rally. Their timely campaign has so far resulted in approximately 40 Bru tribesmen rallying to the GVN.

(1) A study prepared by the G-5 PSYOP Division concludes that the reasons for the decreased Chieu Hoi rates in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces are as follows:

a Reduction in force, and level of combat activities by both the Allies and the enemy.

b The withdrawal of VC and NVA combat units from the lowlands to the mountain base areas.

c The 1 Nov 68 bombing halt and Paris Peace Talks.

d The decreased number of VC local force and VCI in the lowlands.

e A recurrent rumor to the effect that Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces will be given to NVN through negotiations.

(2) It is concluded that the vigorous Chieu Hoi campaign presently being waged in the two provinces in XXIV Corps is not likely to produce a major increase in rallier totals unless a dramatic change occurs in the military/political situation.

d. During this quarter, the XXIV Corps PSYOP Division processed 3,400 requests for leaflets and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts from units under OPCON of XXIV Corps. In response to these requests approximately 200,025,581 leaflets were disseminated and 1,173 hours of messages were broadcast over aerial and ground loudspeakers. Although there has been an increase in the amount of leaflets dropped and in the number of hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, the weather during the latter part of February 1969 and for the major part of March 1969 severely hampered all PSYOP operations.

e. During the period 22 Jan 69 thru 18 Mar 69, the 9th Marine Regiment of the 3d Marine Division conducted Operation Dewey Canyon in the Da Krong Valley. In support of this operation more than 4,200,000 leaflets were dropped against NVA units. A significant aspect of this operation was the discovery of the largest arms caches to be uncovered since the start of the Vietnamese conflict. The PSYOP Division recognizing the importance of this find immediately developed leaflets exploiting this discovery.

f. During the report period a PSYOP campaign was initiated to induce the Montagnard tribesmen in XXIV Corps AO to resettle in GVN secured areas of Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces and to stop fighting FVMAF Forces. The long range program will involve extensive coordination with both GVN and US authorities in order to provide adequate reception and living accommodations. When accomplished, this campaign will deprive the NVA of a sizeable para-military force.

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g. Task Force Clearwater, a naval river security group located on the Cua Viet River in the northern portion of the Corps AO requested assistance from this headquarters in obtaining a PSYOP officer and an NCO to help in the formulation of an effective PSYOP program in their area of responsibility. Through coordination with HQ, III Marine Amphibious Force, a PSYOP trained lieutenant and an NCO were obtained on a TDY basis from the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion for a period of three months. During the period of their assignment, they made an area survey and instituted an effective PSYOP program to include the training to Task Force Clearwater personnel to carry on the program in their absence.

3. (C) Pacification:

a. During the report period statistics indicating the pacification progress made in the XXIV Corps AO, became available for the period 31 Oct 68 to 31 Mar 69. These statistics are listed below:

(1) The number of hamlets in the XXIV Corps AO under GVN security increased from 457 to 582.

(2) The number of contested hamlets in the XXIV Corps AO dropped from 160 to 112.

(3) The number of VC controlled hamlets in the XXIV Corps AO dropped from 94 to 21.

(4) The percentage of population in the XXIV Corps AO under GVN control rose from 68.2 to 87.1.

(5) The percentage of population in the XXIV Corps AO in contested areas dropped from 16.2 to 11.5.

(6) The percentage of population in the XXIV Corps AO under VC control dropped from 8.3 to 2.1.

(7) A number of hamlets were carried as abandoned or not evaluated, and a small percentage of the population was reported as not evaluated during the cited period. A definite decline in these categories began in the February - March 1969 period, and it is expected to continue at a significant rate.

b. Several other measures of progress show the effectiveness of the pacification support efforts of XXIV Corps.

(1) Considerable success has been attained in relocating and resettling civilians to former homes or other areas which became new permanent homes.

a. Approximately 31,467 people have returned to their homes of their own accord between 31 Jan 69 and 30 Apr 69.

b. An additional 8,433 people have been returned under government directed and sponsored movement. This includes 5,900 people who moved back into the Cam Vu area (Cam Lo and Dong Ha Districts) in Quang Tri Province. These people will eventually be able to resume cultivation of up to 2,000 hectares which will be irrigated by pumps installed under the Colombo Plan.

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(2) During the month of March 1969, village and hamlet elections were held in both provinces in the XXIV Corps AO.

a Elections were held in 469 hamlets within XXIV Corps AO.

b Elections were held in 67 villages within the XXIV Corps AO. There was no significant VC interference or known attempts at influencing the outcome. Of significance was the number of incumbents, approximately 50%, reelected, indicating a reasonable degree of satisfaction with current leadership and continuing general stability among officials.

(3) Although the railroad between Hue and Da Nang was actually reopened during the previous report period, the significance of this progress was not realized immediately. The price of a one-way ticket between Hue and Da Nang is approximately 50\$VN. This is approximately one-fourth the cost of bus service between the two cities. This benefit to the people provided by their government is self-evident. The average passenger count has been in excess of 200 people per day travelling south to Da Nang and in excess of 300 per day travelling north to Hue. This does not include a large number of people who purchase tickets and board and depart at intermediate stops. The fact that rail service has been restored is recognized by the enemy as an indication that the GVN influence is increasing. This is borne out by the number of sabotage attempts made on the railroad. Four of these attempts have resulted in minor damage to the track and/or railroad equipment. On one occasion a major bridge was blown which was replaced by mobile Construction Battalion 121. While the bridge was out however, the railway transportation was continued, as a shuttle service was initiated with trains meeting at the blown bridge and passengers exchanging trains using the adjacent QI-1 bridge. Work has begun to open the railroad between Hue and Dong Ha.

(4) Secondary lines of communication have been extended throughout XXIV Corps AO. As of 30 Apr 69 a total of 352 kilometers of secondary roads have been upgraded or built. Experience shows that where roads exist, GVN influence predominates, and the program of upgrading secondary LOCs will eventually affect some 377,700 people within the Corps AO.

(5) Denying rice to the enemy greatly contributes to the pacification effort. A total of 57,000 short tons were harvested during 1968. Of this, approximately 51,300 short tons (90%) of the 1968 crop was secured. A total of 1,800 short tons was captured or destroyed following its discovery in hidden enemy caches. This rice denial has caused the enemy to bring large amounts of rice down the Ho Chi Minh Trail (as evidenced by the capture of 356 tons of Chinese marked rice during Operation Maine Crag). The successful rice denial program has thus compelled the enemy to execute a substantial logistical effort to maintain his subsistence.

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SECTION 2 - LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. COMMAND

None.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) ITEM: PW Unit Identification

a. OBSERVATION: Interrogation reports continue to indicate deception on the part of PW's in the identification of their parent unit. VC personnel have apparently been instructed to identify themselves as NVA soldiers if they are captured in order to receive better treatment. Also it is evident the enemy is exercising great care in removing all identifying documents from personnel before committing them to combat; thus, denying immediate unit identification to intelligence personnel.

b. EVALUATION: Unit identification by PW's reflects deception during interrogation.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Interrogators must be alert and maintain close liaison and coordination with the Order of Battle for unit identification when questioning PW's.

2. (C) ITEM: Cache Report

a. OBSERVATION: Totals of extremely large caches, such as those discovered in Operations Dewey Canyon and Maine Crag, become distorted and erroneous through daily updates due to the lack of centralized accounting procedures prior to release to higher headquarters.

b. EVALUATION: The G2 Intelligence Division, initiated a system for consolidating large cache reports prior to their being released, thereby minimizing errors and duplication in reporting.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a single office of record be established at each echelon of command to receive, consolidate, and report total figures of all large caches discovered.

3. (C) ITEM: Improved Arc Light Targeting

a. OBSERVATION: The procedures formerly employed in Arc Light targeting were not conducive to systematic and efficient operations. To rectify this deficiency the following system was devised: A card file data base was established with cards covering the Corps AO in 10 x 10 grid square blocks. Intelligence data of a non-transitory nature are entered for a period of 90 days and other item for 30 days. Intelligence is also plotted on map overlays on a monthly basis. When an area shows a concentration of activity, that area is plotted on graph paper, all items of intelligence are reviewed, and a target box is drawn. The data in the target box is then entered on a target card and a recommended priority is determined by applying a numerical evaluation system. Each item is evaluated and multiplied by its source value, all sources of information having been compared and given a relative value.

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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The resulting numbers are then added, and the total is multiplied by a probability-of-success factor which considers the nature of the target data, whether ground exploitation and/or operation support is planned, and if the submitting unit (if from an assigned unit) has indicated a priority. The net result is an overall target worth, which is compared to other targets being considered. A recommended target priority is then assigned.

b. EVALUATION: This approach considers all aspects of targeting in a systematic manner and minimizes day to day variations in target planning and priority recommendation.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the system described above be evaluated and adopted by the Arc Light Sections of XXIV Corps units.

4. (C-NOFORN) ITEM: Utilization of Sensor Acquired Information.

a. OBSERVATIONS:

(1) In February 1969, sensor activations indicated a definite enemy build-up in one section of the 3d Marine Division AO. On 25 Feb 69 two fire support bases near the sensor location were attacked by the enemy. The following week sensor activations were almost negative. On 2 Mar 69 another increase of activations began and on 3 and 14 Mar 69, another nearby fire support base was attacked.

(2) Use of sensor acquired information and its integration with other intelligence led to the initiation of Operation Purple Martin and the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) operation in the Ba Long Valley.

b. EVALUATION: The maintenance of daily sensor activations on string records is a valuable source of intelligence information. It provides a count of enemy personnel or vehicles, direction of movement, and speed of the enemy. Use of this information by the G2, and its integration with other intelligence provides the commander with valuable information in determining enemy location, size and activities.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS: That sensor acquired intelligence be exploited, confirmed by reconnaissance, and used to the utmost by commanders.

5. (C) ITEM: Infra-Red (IR) Interpretation

a. OBSERVATION: During a recent operation, IR emissions were lost in a maze of agricultural fires. A detailed study was made the following day, comparing the IR imagery with aerial photography flown.

b. EVALUATION: The comparative study allowed the image interpreter to validate IR emissions and determine significant areas of activity.

c. RECOMMENDATION: The tactical situation permitting, IR imagery be compared with recent aerial photography in order to determine the IR source and the significance of the activity.

C. OPERATIONS

(C) ITEM: Enemy Caches in Bomb Craters

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a. OBSERVATION: During Operation Dewey Canyon units of the 9th Marine Regiment located many ammunition caches in bomb craters.

b. EVALUATION: NVA Forces, realizing the reluctance of US Forces to investigate closely areas with extensive bomb craters, used the craters as caches. Equipment and ammunition were placed in the bottom of craters, covered with bamboo mats and loose dirt shoveled onto the mat, thus recreating the crater bottom.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Units conducting operations in areas that have received air strikes should check craters for caches.

D. LOGISTICS

1. (C) ITEM: Tank Deadline Rate

a. OBSERVATION: During the report period, a large number of M48A3 tanks were deadlined because of mine damage. Due to inability to forecast parts requirements, tanks were deadlined for extended periods, for replacement parts for suspension systems.

b. EVALUATION: Commanders participating in extended operations should request, on highest practical priority, parts for suspension systems of M48A3 tanks as mission essential, based on the history of previous operations. If this information is not available within the unit, that of a comparable unit should be used. Requisitioning prior to, or immediately after beginning operations, should facilitate receipt of parts and decrease deadline time.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That tank units be permitted to request repair parts above that supported by demand data as mission essential, based on past data for similar type operations.

2. (C) ITEM: AN/TPS-25 Radar Set Deadline.

a. OBSERVATION: Operational time for the AN/TPS-25 radar employed along the DMZ is severely hampered because of frequent deadline for parts.

b. EVALUATION: Due to the capabilities and importance of this radar in the vicinity of the DMZ, a high deadline rate is intolerable. The AN/TPS-25 radar has a low density in RVN and repair parts and components for this set are almost non-existent; parts requirements are frequently filled by cannibalization.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken to obtain a stockage of required repair parts and components for AN/TPS-25 radar sets based on usage data.

3. (U) ITEM: Use of CONEX Containers.

a. OBSERVATION: CONEX containers are not always effectively used.

b. EVALUATION: CONEX containers used for essential storage often have supplies or equipment placed on the floors with no provision for using the upper part of the containers.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Recommend units construct appropriate shelving in the containers, thus increasing usable storage space and reducing the number of CONEX containers needed for storage.

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4. (C) ITEM: Supply Support to Isolated Units.

a. OBSERVATION: When using medium (CH-47) and light (UH-1) helicopters for logistical support of a combat operation, it is desirable to have medium helicopters "hook" supplies to the FSB and have the light helicopters "hook" the supplies from the FSB's to the combat units.

b. EVALUATION: To accomplish the above, considerable planning and preparation prior to the operation is required. In planning, the size of the FSB and the limited capability of FSB personnel for breaking down bulk supplies into smaller quantities for unit distribution, must be considered. To avoid burdening a combat unit at an FSB with requirements to break down bulk supplies into smaller quantities, it is desirable to task the medium helicopters to lift several nets of .7-ton loads to the FSB's. This enables the light helicopters to transport a .7-ton load from the FSB to combat units without redistributing supplies to lesser loads.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That whenever possible, the system outlined above be used for resupply of isolated units. It is further recommended that two LZ's within the FSB be used. On a given day, one LZ will be a pickup and the other a delivery point. The following day the pickup and delivery point LZ's are reversed. This precludes the requirement for helicopters delivering supplies and helicopters picking up supplies from using the same LZ simultaneously.

5. (C) ITEM: Control of Helicopters.

a. OBSERVATION: During an operation, logistical aircraft have completed or aborted missions and the task force headquarters was not informed of this until the aircraft had returned to its home base.

b. EVALUATION: It is desirable to have a central control agency at the task force CP with the capability of receiving timely information on mission status of all supporting aircraft. This provides positive control and more efficient use of available aircraft, particularly for critical medevacs and emergency resupply missions.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That whenever possible, centralized control be established for all helicopters involved in an operation.

6. (C) ITEM: Resupply of Isolated Units.

a. OBSERVATION: During adverse weather, emergency resupply has been accomplished by an Air Support Radar Team vectoring aircraft over a target at a predetermined altitude and directing the pilot to paradrop supplies to that unit. On occasions, fifty to one hundred percent of the supplies were not recovered, and the probability exists that these supplies were retrieved by the enemy.

b. EVALUATION: A capability to accurately airdrop supplies into a small drop zone during adverse weather is urgently required.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That fielding of a system such as the radar controlled parawing, presently under development by the Combat Developments Command, be considered for adverse weather emergency resupply.

E. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND MEDICAL

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1. (U) ITEM: Establishment of a XXIV Corps Forward Medical Regulating Office.

a. OBSERVATION: The lack of a forward medical regulating office within XXIV Corps has resulted in uncoordinated patient input to hospitals, hospital ships and medical battalions. As a consequence, the patient load is not always equitably distributed to provide timely, required medical treatment.

b. EVALUATION: A central forward medical regulating office within XXIV Corps, staffed and equipped to communicate with all medical units in the XXIV Corps AO and adjacent waters, could provide the required service stated above. By coordinating patient input and distribution, it would insure that the best use would be made of available medical facilities at all times. The XXIV Corps Surgeon's Office has received authorization from the III MAF's Surgeon's Office to act as a forward medical regulating office for XXIV Corps. However, additional personnel and equipment will be required.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That paragraph 15, Sections II and III, MTOE 52-1T, HHC, XXIV Corps, be changed to include the required personnel and equipment to operate a forward medical regulating office. These changes will be requested in the next MTOE submission.

2. (U) ITEM: Supplies for Support of Jewish Passover-Seder.

a. OBSERVATION: Many supplies which are required for the observance of Jewish Passover-Seder must be ordered and received from the United States. The religious requirement for specific items in specific amounts necessitates accurate planning and ordering in the procurement of these supplies.

b. EVALUATION: Exact religious requirements make it mandatory that all items be available for Seder observances. The time and distance involved in the procurement of these supplies make it extremely difficult to replace items not received.

c. RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That Jewish Chaplains and others responsible for preparation of Seder observances develop an exact list of requirements based on previous years' after action reports, projected requirements for number of personnel involved and facilities available.

(2) That required items be ordered at least six months in advance to allow adequate time for corrective action to be taken in the event any items do not arrive as expected. Also, items should be inventoried immediately on receipt to ascertain if shortages exist.

F. INSPECTOR GENERAL

None.

G. INFORMATION:

None.

H. COMMAND HISTORY

None.

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I. AVIATION

None.

J. SIGNAL

None.

K. ENGINEER

1. (C) ITEM: Helicopter Support for the Land Clearing Company

a. OBSERVATION: The effectiveness of land clearing operations is greatly improved when helicopter support is provided.

b. EVALUATION: Lack of helicopter support has hindered the efficiency of land clearing operations. The land clearing unit commander's planning for the next day's work and control of the trace of the clearing operation is greatly enhanced when the commander of the land clearing force has a helicopter available to provide aerial reconnaissance.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Units conducting land clearing operations should provide helicopter support to the land clearing company.

2. (C) ITEM: Security for Land Clearing Operations.

a. OBSERVATION: Security elements in land clearing operations are often displaced on other missions before land clearing operations are completed.

b. EVALUATION: Land clearing operations are conducted in support of tactical unit operations and security is required for the land clearing company to conduct uninterrupted operations.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That land clearing forces remain intact throughout the operation. Removal of the tactical unit's security force interrupts the fluidity and efficiency of the land clearing operation and thus delays completion.

L. GS ACTIVITIES

None.

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AVHGC-DST (9 Jun 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period
Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 963752 6 JUN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report Lessons-Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning Cache Report, section II, page 22, paragraph B(2); concur. It is considered, however, that Cache Reports should not be delayed an excessive period of time solely for the purpose of consolidating all the information. Supplementary reports, if properly identified and referenced to the initial report, should preclude confusion and duplication. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

b. (U) Reference item concerning Tank Deadline Rate, section II, page 24, paragraph D(1); concur. Para 6-10, AR 735-35 provides for evaluation and forecasting of seasonal or anticipated requirements for repair parts and maintenance related items. All such forecasts should be based on previous experience and should not be an arbitrary and blanket increase in stockage. Unit will be advised.

c. (U) Reference item concerning AN/TPS-25 Radar Set Deadline, section II, page 24, paragraph D(2); nonconcur. Stockage of repair parts for the AN/TPS-25 radar sets on PLL and ASL are demand supported IAW AR 735-35 and AR 711-16 respectively. The majority of the repair parts for the AN/TPS-25 are common electronic repair parts which are readily available in the supply system. The AN/TPS-25 peculiar parts are difficult to obtain; however, to date, no significant problems have been experienced which can be attributed to supply shortages. A review of the Weekly Command Deadline Report for the period 21 Feb 69 - 6 Jun 69 reveals only one occurrence of an AN/TPS-25 radar set belonging to an army unit within XXIV Corps being deadlineed for parts. This radar was deadlineed for parts on 30 May 69 and was deadlineed for less than one week. No data is available on the three AN/TPS-25 radars belonging to 3d Marine Division and supported by 63d Maint Bn. In addition, all major components of the AN/TPS-25 are on the repair and return program to Sacramento Army Depot. XXIV Corps is being informed of this information by separate message.

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AVHGO-DST (9 Jun 69)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period
Ending 30 April 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

d. (U) Reference item concerning use of CONEX Containers, section II, page 24, paragraph D(3); concur. The construction of temporary shelving in CONEX containers used for essential storage is permissible as long as the container is not permanently altered and the sides of the container are not punctured. Unit will be advised.

e. (C) Reference item concerning Resupply of Isolated Units, section II, page 25, paragraph D(6); concur. The parawing was demonstrated at Da Nang and Nha Trang during March-May 1969. Equipment will be available at the 5th Special Forces Group in Nha Trang through mid July. Unit will be advised that additional information may be obtained from the MACV Science Advisors Office, HQ MACV - MACSA, APO 96222.

f. (U) Reference item concerning establishment of a XXIV Corps Forward Medical Regulating Office, section II, page 26, paragraph E(1). Upon receipt of the proposed MTOE it will be evaluated and processed by this headquarters. Unit will be notified. No further action required by higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
XXIV Corps

GPOP-DT (9 Jun 69) 2d Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, XXIV Corps for Period Ending
30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 6 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ment and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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